2011 0-7734-1495-9 This book offers a causal account of knowledge as a true belief caused by the state of affairs in the world. It also presents a conceptual theory of epistemic reasons. Although both foundationalism and coherentism provide some insights into what constitutes a good epistemic reason for belief, it is argued that neither view provides a satisfactory account of good epistemic reasons. This is because foundationalism results in a dogmatic viewpoint, and coherentism does not serve to tie one's beliefs to the world. Instead, it is argued that good epistemic reasons not only depend upon the context in which they are offered in defending claims to knowledge, but also upon a grounding of such reasons in something that is known. It is argued that this pragmatic, contextual account of epistemic reasons anchored in the world offers an antidote to skepticism while also preserving our pre-analytic understanding of what constitutes a good reason for belief.