Subject Area: Nuclear Era
In this provocative book Hallett argues that dropping the atomic bomb on Japan had no impact on their surrender to America. What was more important was the threat of a Soviet and American invasion, and the Japanese government preferred to deal with America rather than have the Soviets turn the country communist.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were certainly evil, but how evil? Evil in which way? Conventionally, their evil has been explained away by repeating that the atomic bombings ‘ended the war to save lives.’ If true, the evil was not truly evil.
In this book, Professor Hallett challenges this all too comforting explanation. If lives were saved, then how many were saved, he asks? Did bombs cause the surrender of Japan; or was the Soviet involvement in the Pacific another influence among many that coincided with the end of the war?
Reviewing the dramatic events of August, 1945, Hallett concludes that few, if any lives were saved and that the dropping of the atomic bombs was merely coincidental with the ending of the war. Instead, Soviet entry into the Pacific War was the immediate causal factor in the timing of the Japanese surrender. This study concludes that there was a banal evil induced by an ordinary lack of imagination on the part of President Truman and the American officials.2000 0-7734-7891-4
This volume provides as complete a bibliographical and descriptive record as possible of English-language plays that deal directly and significantly with “the Bomb”, a code-term denoting all major aspects of the Nuclear Age that relate to atomic weapons (but not to nuclear power). Descriptions of the plays are oriented toward their content as nuclear-age dramas. The descriptions are presented in chronological order, since the plays vary in nature and number according to the nuclear situation that existed in the real world. It includes a selective chronology of that evolving situation along with the landmarks of literature and journalism that it spawned. An index of playwrights concludes the volume.2002 0-7734-7959-7
This study examines the political process of nuclear decision-making and explores attitudes toward nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and how they impact the peace process. The major countries in the region are examined from several viewpoints to highlight the most critical issues and problems facing the region.2002 0-7734-6901-X
This book contributes to the scholarship on nuclear strategy by proposing an alternative strategy to both current U.S. nuclear strategy which emphasizes speed of attack, and critical recommendations that urge decoupling U.S. nuclear weapons from delivery vehicles. It advocates adopting instead a U.S. nuclear operational doctrine of delayed retaliation.1987 0-88946-330-1
A summary and evaluation of issues and arguments surrounding the new nuclear arms race as it developed from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s.2010 0-7734-3706-1
This work offers both qualitative and quantitative analyses of how the presence of
nuclear weapons effects conflict escalation rates among international states. The
qualitative section of the book focuses on the volatile Indo-Pakistani relationship and clearly demonstrates that the addition of nuclear weapons has served to retard conflict escalation between the two.2014 0-7734-0076-1
This fascinating and scholarly study analyzes the concept of framing in the context of nuclear energy. Framing is the tool used for highlighting information in order to perpetuate understanding within the body of a news story to fit the framer’s agenda on the topic. Dr. DiPalma argues that the manner in which mass media “frames” nuclear energy news stories compromises the end readers understanding of the true risks and true rewards of this “green” energy source and undermines appropriate and necessary public policy debate on this issue.2003 0-7734-6703-3
This work challenges the assertion that the nuclear freeze and Western European movements forced Ronald Reagan to embrace arms control and improve Soviet-American relations during his presidency. While these movements put tremendous pressure on Reagan, they never fundamentally altered his conception of how to reduce nuclear weapons significantly. Besides outlining Reagan’s complex interaction with these movements, this work will show that Reagan’s conduct and personal views played a crucial role in bringing about the Soviet-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987.