Herrick, Robert W.

About the author: Dr. Robert Herrick received his PhD in International Law and Relations from Columbia University. He has had a wealth of research experiences in various topical areas and has produced many dozens of studies. These have included reports and monographs on foreign policy problems, disarmament matters, naval and military subjects. These were prepared for the Office Naval Intelligence in the Pentagon and in Moscow, for CIA at Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Munich, and other agencies. He has published two previous books on Soviet naval strategy.

Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy 1956-1986
2003 0-7734-6895-1
This exhaustive study is a sequel to the authors earlier work, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkovs Inheritance (1917-1956) (Naval War College Press, 1988). It begins with a summary of that work, and a wealth of previously classified material has been exploited in preparing this and subsequent chapters. This included the restricted distribution issues from 1975-1980 of the journal of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Voennaya mysl (Military Thought). The scarlet thread that ran through the entire history of the Soviet Navy is that of the debate over the nature of command of the sea and its significance for naval strategy. Entwined with that was a continuing debate as to the Navys requirement for aircraft carriers as the indispensable ship type for executing whatever command-of-the-sea strategy was accepted at the moment. Always present was the Armys vehement opposition to the Navy being funded to construct any aircraft carriers whatsoever. This fascinating story is set out in the most complete detail possible from available sources. Having all the evidence on the record and available should prove to be a helpful point of departure for future students of the Russian Navys theory and shipbuilding policy.

Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy 1956-1986
2003 0-7734-6897-8
This exhaustive study is a sequel to the authors earlier work, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkovs Inheritance (1917-1956) (Naval War College Press, 1988). It begins with a summary of that work, and a wealth of previously classified material has been exploited in preparing this and subsequent chapters. This included the restricted distribution issues from 1975-1980 of the journal of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Voennaya mysl (Military Thought). The scarlet thread that ran through the entire history of the Soviet Navy is that of the debate over the nature of command of the sea and its significance for naval strategy. Entwined with that was a continuing debate as to the Navys requirement for aircraft carriers as the indispensable ship type for executing whatever command-of-the-sea strategy was accepted at the moment. Always present was the Armys vehement opposition to the Navy being funded to construct any aircraft carriers whatsoever. This fascinating story is set out in the most complete detail possible from available sources. Having all the evidence on the record and available should prove to be a helpful point of departure for future students of the Russian Navys theory and shipbuilding policy.

Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy 1956-1986 Book Three
2003 0-7734-6899-4
This exhaustive study is a sequel to the author's earlier work, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkovs Inheritance (1917-1956) (Naval War College Press, 1988). It begins with a summary of that work, and a wealth of previously classified material has been exploited in preparing this and subsequent chapters. This included the restricted distribution issues from 1975-1980 of the journal of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Voennaya mysl (Military Thought). The scarlet thread that ran through the entire history of the Soviet Navy is that of the debate over the nature of 'command of the sea' and its significance for naval strategy. Entwined with that was a continuing debate as to the Navy's requirement for aircraft carriers as the indispensable ship type for executing whatever command-of-the-sea strategy was accepted at the moment. Always present was the Army's vehement opposition to the Navy being funded to construct any aircraft carriers whatsoever. This fascinating story is set out in the most complete detail possible from available sources. Having all the evidence on the record and available should prove to be a helpful point of departure for future students of the Russian Navy's theory and shipbuilding policy.