Shaw, Daniel Books

Daniel J. Shaw received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Adelaide, South Australia. He has been a lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland since 1970. He has contributed to several philosophical books and journals. Previously published works include Reason and Feeling in Hume’s Action Theory and Moral Philosophy (Mellen, 1998) and A Study of the Complex and Disputed Philosophical Questions surrounding Human Action (Mellen, 1999).

Philosophical Account of the Nature of Art Appreciation
2000 0-7734-7495-1
An appropriate subtitle for this work would be Appreciation, Intention and Truth in the Arts. Its three aims are: a) to give a philosophical account of the nature of art appreciation as well as aesthetic appreciation outside the arts; b) to examine the ways in which the artist’s intention is relevant to interpreting, appreciating and evaluating works of art; and finally c) to explore some of the ways that certain works of art can provide a unique form of understanding human behavior, morality, and life.

Reason and Feeling in Hume's Action Theory and Moral Philosophy Hume's Reasonable Passion
1998 0-7734-8282-2
Based upon a study of arguments in the Treatise and the Enquiry, this work proposes a theory of motivation and of the making of moral judgments which is Humean in two important ways: it defends (1) Hume's anti-rationalist claim that reason alone cannot either motivate action or lead to the making of moral judgment, and (2) Hume's 'sentimentalist' claim that feeling is always essentially involved in both. This defence of Hume's sentimentalism stops short of endorsing Hume's slave metaphor ('the reason is and ought only to be a slave of the passions') and argues instead for an equal partnership view of reason and feeling.

Study of the Complex and Disputed Philosophical Questions Surrounding Human Action
1998 0-7734-7737-3
This study presents a dualist account of the nature of human action, dualist in a modest sense in that it defends the claim that generally actions involve two kinds of components – the physical and the mental – and that the mental components – the experiential awareness – cannot be interpreted in materialist of functionalist ways fashionable of late. The study identifies eleven elements or data concerning our everyday idea of human action. It then gives an account of the voluntary which, in stressing its character as an all-pervasive awareness of what it is like to be doing something as opposed to having things happen to one, neatly avoids the pitfalls of infinite regress associated with ‘acts of will’. The account of motives is fleshed out and defended against various well-known objections. Finally, the study spells out the author’s approach to freedom and indeterminism.